The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable
Volume 2 | Issue 1

Article 14

1-1-1995

Taking Care of Two: Criminalizing the Ingestion of
Controlled Substances during Pregnancy
Lisa M. Noller

Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/roundtable
Recommended Citation
Noller, Lisa M. (1995) "Taking Care of Two: Criminalizing the Ingestion of Controlled Substances during Pregnancy," The University
of Chicago Law School Roundtable: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 14.
Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/roundtable/vol2/iss1/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in The University of Chicago Law
School Roundtable by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Taking Care of Two: Criminalizing the
Ingestion of Controlled Substances during
Pregnancy
LISA M. NOLLER

Jill is a seventeen-year-old mother of three children. Each Wednesday, she
attends a Parents Too Soon program at a local YWCA. The goal of the
program is to teach teenage mothers about abstinence and about having a
healthy child under difficult circumstances. Jill attends each week, and it is a
rare Wednesday that she has not been drinking before she arrives. She smokes
throughout the meetings, and threatens to drop out of the program when she
is asked to stop. Jill is pregnant with her fourth child.
Jill's companions in Parents Too Soon are very much like her-all have
children, many are pregnant, and many smoke and drink regularly. Some have
experimented with drugs, but few are addicts. Once their children are born,
the students' parents raise the kids, leaving the teens free to continue their irresponsible lifestyles. Children whose grandparents cannot care for them are sent
to day care centers that will accept them. Some in the program have given
birth to deformed children, but none of the girls has openly expressed regret
about her deformed child, and none has said that she will discontinue having
sex while smoking and drinking. When asked, all have said that they are
afraid of jail.'
Previous studies on this topic have suggested a range of measures to
combat the problem of women ingesting harmful substances while pregnant,
from government funding for a "public health nurse"2 to a hands-off "mother
knows best" approach. 3 Such remedies are inadequate, as they allow the
mother to continue her destructive behavior. Moreover, since only a small
percentage of women who enroll in rehabilitative programs are able to remain

Lisa Noller is a J.D. candidate at the University of Chicago. She received her B.A. from
Boston College in 1992.
1. This anecdote is based on the author's personal experience volunteering at the
Harris YWCA on Chicago's South Side. Names were changed to retain confidentiality.
2. Note, The Problem of the Drug-Exposed Newborn: A Return to Principled Intervention, 42 Stan L Rev 745, 807-08 (1990).
3. Susan Goldberg, Medical Choices during Pregnancy: Whose Decision Is It Anyway?,
41 Rutgers L Rev 591, 603-04 (1989).
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drug-free, 4 these programs alone will not solve the problem. This Comment
suggests a different solution. The only remedy that will consistently and
thoroughly combat the problem is the same one prescribed for non-pregnant
substance abusers' and used so far by several courtsO-incarceration. While
this proposal may be unpopular,7 it nevertheless is in the best interests of the
thousands of children each year who are born from the wombs of addicted
mothers.
Medical data now reveal an undisputed link between the use of controlled
substances' during pregnancy and birth defects. 9 But current laws do not
specifically or adequately protect a fetus from its mother's potentially harmful
behavior. In response, prosecutors rely on civil tort statutes, neglect statutes,
or broader criminal statutes in an effort to punish the mother for her destructive behavior. These statutes, however, were not written to remedy the problem. Lacking the necessary tools to protect the unborn, prosecutors often do
not bring suit. Those who do often fail. Meanwhile, pregnant women continue
to use drugs, and babies continue to bear the scars of their mothers' addictions.
This Comment argues that incarceration may be the only way to deter Jill

4. Judy Howard, Chronic Drug Users as Parents, 43 Hastings L J 645, 659 (1992).
5. See, for example, 21 USC S 841(b)(1)(A) (1994) (requiring incarceration for offenders who manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances).
6. See, for example, Nichols v United States, 114 S Ct 1921, 1924-25 (1994)
(upholding sentence of a maximum jail term allowed under Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and 21 USC 5 841(b)); United States v Frazier, 28 F3d 99, 100-01 (11th Cir 1994)
(upholding twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence required by 21 USC 5 841(b)(1)(A));
Wade v United States, 112 S Ct 1840, 1841 (1992) (upholding ten-year minimum sentence
required by 21 USC S 841(b)(1)(B)).
7. See, for example, Note, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implica-

tions of Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 NYU Rev L & Soc
Change 277 (1987-88) (arguing that legislatures should not use criminalization as a tool
for encouraging healthy pregnancies).
8. The United States Code defines "controlled substance" as any "drug or other
substance, or immediate precursor" that the United States Attorney General determines
should be regulated, based on eight factors:
1.
Its actual or relative potential for abuse

2.
3.

Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known
The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug or other

substance
4.

5.
6.
7.

8.

Its history and current pattern of abuse
The scope, duration, and significance of abuse
What, if any, risk there is to the public health
Its psychic or physiological dependence liability

Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already
controlled under [21 USC S 811]
21 USC SS 802(6), 811(c) (1981). The term does not include "distilled spirits, wine, malt
beverages, or tobacco, as those terms are defined or used in subtitle E of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954." 21 USC S 802(6) (1981).
9. F. Gary Cunningham, et al, eds, Williams Obstetrics 959-80 (Appleton and Lance,
19th ed 1993).
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and other women from ingesting hazardous substances during pregnancy. If
more women believed that ingesting hazardous substances while pregnant
would result in imprisonment, more would discontinue using drugs. Maybe
then more children could look forward to healthy lives.
This Comment first discusses the background surrounding the current
debate. An examination of the problem will demonstrate that a significant
number of women ingest controlled substances during pregnancy, and that
these drugs harm a woman's fetus. The Comment examines proposed legislative and judicial remedies and finds that they are not sufficient. It argues that
the courts, in an effort to balance a mother's right to autonomy and a baby's
right to a healthy life, have usurped the legislature's role and created inconsistent precedents. The lawmakers, on the other hand, have been slow to act,
preferring to leave this issue to the courts.
This Comment then examines solutions to the current disarray and endorses a statute that criminalizes the ingestion of controlled substances during
pregnancy. This proposal is better than the current scheme because it conveys
a strong message to pregnant drug users and provides a single source of law
upon which both mothers and judges can rely.
I. Background
A.

MEDICAL DATA

Any behavior during pregnancy may affect the fetus.'0 For example, some
physicians warn their patients not to ride horses, play sports, or have intercourse
during the later stages of pregnancy because these physicians believe these acts
may cause irreparable harm to the fetus." There is no data to support these restrictions.12 On the other hand, physicians also warn against drug, alcohol, and
tobacco use during pregnancy-activity which definitely has been shown to cause
harm. 13 Substance abuse during pregnancy may result in mental and physical
deformities, slower fetal development, or premature birth, which may in turn
lead to a higher risk of death after birth.14
There is an undisputed connection between substance abuse during pregnancy and serious mental and physical defects in newborns."5 Different noncontrolled substances cause varying degrees of deformity. Food additives such as

10. Helene M. Cole, Legal Interventions during Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical
Treatments and Legal Penaltiesfor Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264
JAMA 2663, 2663 (1990).
11. Interview with Kenneth L. Noller, M.D., Professor and Chair, Department of
Obstetrics and Gynecology, University of Massachusetts Medical School (Jan 14, 1994).
12. Id.
13. Cunningham, et al, eds, Williams Obstetrics at 961 (cited in note 9).
14. Id at 973-76.
15. Cole, 264 JAMA at 2666-67 (cited in note 10). Cole's article cites several studies
that prove the link between substance abuse and abnormalities in newborns.
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saccharines, nitrites, and sulfites may affect a fetus." Some prescription drugs
are more harmful. For example, the prescription drug tetracycline may ultimately
discolor a baby's teeth. 7 Cigarette smoking may cause "spontaneous abortion,
premature birth, increased infant perinatal mortality, low birth weight, and negative effects on later growth and development in infants."" Alcohol abuse increases the risk of abnormalities among newborns, including cardiac defects,
prenatal growth retardation, and developmental delay, 9 as well as "limb, skull
and facial defects, impaired fine- and gross-motor function, and impaired
intellectual functions." 2
Use of illegal drugs during pregnancy is of special concern. Experts estimate
that eleven percent of women have used illegal drugs during pregnancy.2
Smoking marijuana even once leads to prolonged fetal exposure to the drug.2
The drug raises carbon monoxide levels in the fetus's bloodstream and impairs
fetal oxygenation, which may lead to growth anomalies in weight, length, and
head circumference. 3 Physicians are even more concerned about maternal cocaine use, including ingestion of the street drug, "crack." Cocaine use is associated with newborns' smaller brain circumference, fetal hypoxia,24 and suppressed appetite." Cocaine use during pregnancy also increases the chance of in
utero stroke, spontaneous abortion, abruptio placentae, and death during
infancy.2 ' Children whose mothers used cocaine when they were fetuses are
more likely to be physically deformed and are prone to suffer withdrawal symptoms that make them irritable and less eager to bond with those around them. 7

16. Goldberg, 41 Rutgers L Rev at 602 n 85 (cited in note 3).
17. See Grodin v Grodin, 102 Mich App 396, 301 NW2d 869, 869 (1981) (noting
that taking tetracycline during pregnancy makes children's teeth "brown and discolored").
18. Cunningham, et al, eds, Williams Obstetrics at 974 (cited in note 9); Cole, 264
JAMA at 2666 (cited in note 10).
19. Cunningham, et al, eds, Williams Obstetrics at 973-74 (cited in note 9); Eileen
Ouellette, et al, Adverse Effects on Offspring of Maternal Alcohol Abuse during Pregnancy, 297 New Eng J Med 528, 530 (1977).
20. Cole, 264 JAMA at 2667 (cited in note 10).
21. Id at 2666.
22. The active ingredient in marijuana, THC, is fat-soluble. Thus it remains in the
system for as many as thirty days after inhalation. Barry Zuckerman, et al, Effects of
Maternal Marijuana and Cocaine Use on Fetal Growth, 320 New Eng J Med 762, 765-66
(1989).
23. Id.
24. Id at 766. Fetal hypoxia is a deficiency of oxygen reaching the tissues. During a
fetus's development, a lack of oxygen may cause severely deformed tissues and limbs, and
it may permanently damage some organs. Andrew C. Revkin, Crack in the Cradle,
Discover 63, 68 (Sept 1986).
25. Zuckerman, et al, 320 New Eng J Med at 765-66 (cited in note 22).
26. See Cunningham, et al, eds, Williams Obstetrics at 975 (cited in note 9); Ira J.
Chasnoff, et al, Cocaine Use in Pregnancy, 313 N Eng J Med 666, 668-69 (1985); David
Acker, et el, Abruptio Placentae Associated with Cocaine Use, 146 Am J Obstet Gynecol,
220, 220-21 (1983); Revkin, Discover at 66-68 (cited in note 24).
27. Cole, 264 JAMA at 2666 (cited in note 10). See also Ira J. Chasnoff, Drug Use
in Pregnancy: Parameters of Risk, 35 Pediatric Clin N Am 1403, 1406-07 (1988).
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They may also suffer learning disabilities.2"
A more recent concern is the increased risk of mothers transmitting AIDS to
newborns through intravenous drug use. 9 It is estimated that fifty percent of
mothers with the AIDS virus will transmit it to their fetuses and that half of
these babies will die within the first fifteen months of their lives.3"
B. LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES

Recently, politicians have directed more attention to the elimination of drugs
from our society. In 1989, President Bush created the position of "Drug Czar"
to call attention to and combat the problem of drug abuse in America. Since
1984, Congress has enacted harsher penalties for drug users and distributors31
In addition, some state legislatures have recognized the dangers inherent in drug
abuse by pregnant women and addressed the problem with legislation directed
specifically at this issue. 2
1. Drug treatment, education, and counseling.
Several states have enacted measures that create educational programs
designed to provide preventative counseling and education. 33 These measures
are designed to deter drug and alcohol abuse during pregnancy. One of the most
comprehensive programs exists in Illinois, where the following services may be
obtained:

28. Revkin, Discover at 68 (cited in note 24). Maternal drug use may also affect the
environment in which a newborn is raised. One study concluded that, "opiate and other
psychoactive drug use during pregnancy has serious consequences for the mother and
fetus." Public Health Service, US Department of Health and Human Services, Caring for
Our Future: The Content of Prenatal Care 20 (HHS, 1989). Drug use can contribute to
a poor parenting environment and inadequate maternal care. Id.
29. Robert Steinbrook, Steps to Reduce Rise of AIDS in Babies Urged, LA Times, 2
2 at 1 (Feb 21, 1987).
30. Id, S 2 at 6. The US Public Health Service says that most of the newest cases of
AIDS are among newborns who received the virus from their infected mothers. Public
Health Service, US Dept of Health and Human Services, Caring For Our Future at 20
(cited in note 28).
31. See, for example, the recent changes in 21 USC S 844 (1984, 1986, 1988, 1990,
1994).
32. It appears that, since legislators have increased the number of drug-related offenses,
local law enforcement officials have increased the number of arrests for drug-related

crimes. See Thomas Clavin, Growing Number of Drunk Drivers Proving Elusive to Police,
NY Times, Long Island Edition S 13 at 1 (Aug 28, 1994).
33. See, for example, Cal Health & Safety Code S 11757.59(b)(2)(D) (West 1991);
Colo Rev Stat Ann 5 25-1-203(2)(c) (West 1993); Conn Gen Stat Ann 5 17a-644(a) (West
1992); Fla Stat Ann § 396.1816 (West 1993); I11
Comp Stat Ann ch 20, 5 305135(i)(4)(C)
(Smith-Hurd 1994); Kan Stat Ann 5 65-1,163 (1992); La Rev Stat Ann § 46:2505 (West
1994); Md Health-General Code Ann S 8-403.1 (1994); Minn Stat Ann S 123.709 (West
1993); Mo Ann Stat S 191.725 (Vernon 1994); NY Pub Health Law S 2526 (McKinney
1993); Ohio Rev Code Ann S 3793.15 (Page 1992); Or Rev Stat SS 430.915 (1994),
430.920 (1994); Wis Stat Ann S 146.183 (West 1994).
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a range of educational or counseling services.... [c]omprehensive and
coordinated social services, including substance abuse therapy groups,
family therapy groups for the treatment of alcoholism and other drug abuse
and dependency; family therapy groups; programs to develop positive selfawareness; parent-child therapy, and residential support groups.34
Illinois statutes also create referral agencies that are designed to provide services
to pregnant women and to encourage them to enroll in any of the following
programs: Drug Free Families in the Future, Families With a Future, Prenatal
Care Program, and Parents Too Soon.3" Each program is designed to convey
information regarding the dangers of abusing controlled substances during
pregnancy and to prevent their use during future pregnancies. Unfortunately,
these services are mandated only for pregnant women and children living in
special "residences or recovery areas." 36 No compulsory education programs
exist, so women not living under the state's care are unlikely to receive these
rehabilitative services.
Women not enrolled in a program must find one on their own. This is not
a simple task. It is estimated that there are more than one million addicts who
would like drug abuse counseling but are unable to get it.37 It is extraordinarily
difficult for those without private insurance to obtain treatment; they must
sometimes wait several months for an opening.38 The situation is even worse for
pregnant addicts. In 1989, Michelle Oberman, a professor at Loyola University
School of Law in Chicago, telephoned drug treatment centers in Chicago,
claiming to be interested in finding treatment for a pregnant, drug-addicted
friend. Professor Oberman discovered that it was difficult for her "friend" to
receive counseling or rehabilitative services. The Illinois Department of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse had available a list of licensed treatment facilities, but
the list was being updated and would cost twenty-five dollars when it became
available (a six-month wait). 9 The in-patient treatment centers that Oberman
contacted on her own averaged twelve thousand dollars per month, and none
accepted Medicaid or offered financial assistance.4" Outpatient treatment centers
also offered no or limited financial assistance and often referred Oberman away
from their facilities.4 This combination of costly services and a limited number

34. Il1 Comp Stat Ann ch 20 5 305/35-5(i)(4)(C)-(D) (Smith-Hurd 1994). For examples

of similar state programs, see Cal Health & Safety Code S 11757.59 (West 1991) and
NY Pub Health Law S 2526 (McKinney 1993).
35. III Comp Stat Ann ch 20, 5 301/35-5(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1994).

36. Id.
37. Andrew H. Malcolm, In Making Drug Strategy, No Accord on Treatment, NY
Times S 1 at 1, 34 (Nov 19, 1989).
38. Id.
39. Michelle Oberman, Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the Problems
of Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, 43 Hastings L J 505, 517 (1992).
40. Id.
41. Id.
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of treatment slots means that many pregnant addicts will not receive the treatment they need to begin healthier lifestyles and deliver healthy babies.
Even if drug treatment facilities had more beds, the facilities would be
reluctant to admit pregnant addicts for several reasons. First, pregnant women
tend to skip their appointments. 2 Consequently, it is expensive to maintain
these women on an active enrollment roster. Second, treatment centers wish to
avoid legal liability and know that pregnant addicts are more likely to have
complicated pregnancies.43 Third, many pregnant addicts are at a high risk of
contracting HIV" and might spread the disease to other patients; both of these
factors add to the centers' liability concerns. Fourth, pregnant addicts require
more care than other addicts.45 For example, the treatment center employees
must address not only the mother's concerns, but also those of the fetus, who
may also be a drug addict. In practice, this means that drugs and other treatments prescribed to help cure a mother of her addiction must be checked to
ensure that they will not harm the fetus. The centers may also be primarily
responsible for providing normal, but essential, prenatal care to the mother and
the fetus. Many treatment centers may also turn away pregnant addicts for
simple efficiency reasons. Drug treatment does not always succeed. Treatment
centers will have a larger number of successes if they serve several non-pregnant
patients rather than devote time and resources to a single pregnant addict.
Moreover, insufficient reimbursement from state-run health care plans such as
Medicaid make pregnant drug abusers unattractive patients since centers will not
be fully compensated for their efforts."
Education and counseling programs administered by drug treatment facilities
or other sources are not very successful. 4 Given the difficulty that pregnant addicts have seeking private care services, the state faces an uphill task if it strives
to replace these programs with state-managed ones, since the state may not have
any more money available than do private groups. Furthermore, state-managed
programs may be unsuccessful for other reasons. Participants in such programs
are often required to enroll because of a state mandate; therefore, they may not
be enthusiastic about attending sessions regularly. Also, since participants are
often not spending their own money, they may not try to get the most "bang for
their buck." For example, Parents Too Soon, one of the referral services specifically listed in an Illinois counseling statute, 41 is supposed to discourage teen
mothers from bearing more children and from ingesting hazardous substances
during pregnancy. Many of the program's participants are either substance
abusers (including alcohol) or drug addicts, and most of the teeh enrollees have

42. Id at 518.
43. Id.
44. Id at 519.
45. Id.
46. Id at 518.
47. Beth G. Reed, Developing Women-Sensitive Drug-Dependence Treatment Services:
Why So Difficult?, 19 J Psyclioactive Drugs 151, 152 (1987).
48. II1
Comp Stat Ann ch 20 S 301135-5(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1994).
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more than one child.4" The women appear at the program's headquarters
weekly and are bombarded with information designed to accomplish the
program's purpose."0 Unfortunately, the information does not seem to improve
their behavior from week to week. Many of the program's administrators frequently complain that their attempts to educate and counsel are ineffective.5'
This dissatisfaction may explain the high turnover rate among the paid counselors responsible for the program. Given such programs' failures, it is no surprise
that the number of babies born addicted to drugs is not decreasing, and in fact
the number may be steadily increasing. 2
2. Mandatory reporting.
Several states mandate that physicians administer toxicology tests to pregnant women who have obstetrical complications that the physician suspects may
be due to nonmedical ingestion of a controlled substance. 3 Such tests may determine whether there is evidence that the mother has ingested a controlled
substance, and the state may use this information to treat the mother and her
newborn. For example, in Minnesota, "if the test results are positive, the physician shall report the results as neglect under [the state child abuse and neglect
statute]." 4 Social service agencies may then investigate the level of care that the
mother will be able to give to her newborn, and if they find that the level of care
is inadequate, the state may assume custody of the child until the mother's
condition stabilizes."5
Other states instruct physicians who suspect that a pregnant woman has
used drugs to test her newborn for the presence of controlled substances."' Still
other states mandate that agencies report the number of addicted pregnant
women living in the state. 7 To accurately report this number, physicians would
seemingly have to administer toxicology tests to all women who seek their care.
There are two major problems with these mandatory testing statutes. First,
the statutes are more remedial than preventative. Intervention should occur
before the child is born. Currently, statutes provide for testing after a mother's
drug use has likely harmed the fetus (for example, heavy drinking has the
greatest developmental effect during the first trimester of pregnancy"). To
maximize the preventive benefit to the fetus, physician testing would have to be

49. This information is based on the author's volunteer experience at the Harris
YWCA on Chicago's South Side, including interviews with program participants and
administrators.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Bill Barol, et al, Cocaine Babies: Hooked at Birth, Newsweek 56 (Jul 28, 1986);
Revkin, Discover at 63-64 (cited in note 24).
53. See, for example, Minn Stat Ann 5 626.5562(1) (West 1994).
54. Minn Stat Ann S 626.5562(2) (West 1994).
55. Minn Stat Ann 5 626.556(10) (West 1994).
56. See, for example, Wis Stat Ann 5 146.0255 (West 1993).
57. See, for example, Ohio Rev Code Ann S 3793.15(B)(1) (Baldwin 1993).
58. See Ouellette, et al, 297 New Eng J Med at 530 (cited in note 19).

19951

Taking Care of Two 375

administered earlier in the pregnancy. Second, after a mother has been reported
for drug use, many statutes do not mandate treatment for her substance abuse
problem."9 If the abuser is not cured of her addiction or adequately deterred
from continuing to ingest drugs, she may continue to use drugs or drink alcohol.
This practice will not result in her bearing fewer children with defects, since the
testing often happens after the newborn's birth.
3. Legislative protection of the fetus.
A few states have criminalized certain behavior that harms the fetus."0
Many state statutes add aborting a fetus to the list of crimes punished under
murder and manslaughter statutes. For example, 5 187(a) of the California Penal
Code provides, " ... murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or of a
fetus, with malice aforethought."61 Additionally, chapter 720 of the Illinois
Penal Code criminalizes the murder of a fetus. 2 In Minnesota this idea has been
extended to include not just death but also less severe injuries to the fetus. For
example, injury resulting from vehicular operation,63 murder of an unborn
child, 64 manslaughter of an unborn child,6' assault of an unborn child," and
injury or death to an unborn child in the commission of a crime6 7 are all punishable under the Minnesota penal code. Unfortunately, several of these statutes
only apply to harm to a viable fetus. For example, in Minnesota, if the fetus
could not have survived outside the mother at the time of its death, then its killer
cannot be punished under these statutes. 8
Perhaps a more important limitation is the fact that no state has criminalized
a mother's actions toward the fetus while it is still living in her womb. This

59. See, for example, Minn Stat Ann S 626.556(2)(c) (West 1994), which defines negligent behavior by a mother to include ingestion of controlled substances during pregnancy.
However, the statute specifically does not mandate that a mother has a duty to provide
non-negligent care for her child. See also Minn Stat Ann S 626.556(10) (West 1994),
which outlines reporting procedures but never mandates treatment.
60. See, for example, Cal Penal Code S 187(a) (West 1988); 111Comp Stat Ann ch
720 SS 5/9-1.2, 519-2.1, 5/9-3.2, 5/12-3.1, 5/12-4.4 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Minn Stat Ann S
609.266 et seq (West 1987).
61. Cal Penal Code S 187(a) (West 1988) (emphasis added).
62. I11Comp Stat Ann ch 720 5 5/9-1.2(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1993) ("[a] person commits
the offense of intentional homicide of an unborn child if, in performing the acts which
cause the death of an unborn child, he, without lawful justification: . . . either intended
to cause the death of or do great bodily harm to the pregnant woman or her unborn
child or knew that such acts would- cause death or great bodily harm to the pregnant
woman or unborn child . . . ").
63. Minn Stat Ann S 609.21(4) (West 1994).
64. Minn Stat Ann § 609.2661, 609.2662, 609.2663 (West 1987).
65. Minn Stat Ann S§ 609.2664 (West 1987), 609.2665 (West 1994).
66. Minn Stat Ann SS 609.267, 609.2671 (West 1994), 609.2672 (West 1987).
67. Minn Stat Ann § 609.268 (West 1987).
68. See, for example, Minn Stat Ann SS 609.21(4), 609.267, 609.2671 (West 1994),
609.268 (West 1987) (injured unborn child must "subsequently be born alive" for injury
to be subject to statutory penalties).
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means that prosecutors must creatively manipulate statutes that do not expressly
address the issue in order to charge mothers whose drug addiction harms the
fetus. Cases prosecuted in this ad hoc manner leave the state without consistent
precedent on which to rely when prosecuting these cases. Another problem the
state faces is that women charged under the existing statutes can plead a lack of
notice, since the statutory language does not clearly prohibit ingestion of controlled substances during pregnancy. Further, it is not clear that the lawmakers
who wrote the statutes anticipated their use to prosecute pregnant addicts.
Where this is the case, legislative intent may be construed in the mother's favor,
and not the fetus's.
Instead of criminalizing a mother's conduct toward the fetus, the existing
statutes prompt abuse and neglect proceedings" or offer rehabilitative services.7" However, these statutes are also problematic. One can imagine a case in
which a third party harms the fetus by injecting the mother with heroin (and is
held criminally liable when the fetus subsequently dies), but, absurdly, a mother
who does the same act goes unpunished under the same state statutes. These
laws should be rewritten to remedy this inconsistent result.7'
Of course, fetuses are harmed through other acts not caused by the mother,
which have arguably worse results than those mentioned above. For example, in
United States v Spencer,7 2 a man was convicted of homicide for kicking and
stabbing a pregnant woman in the abdomen.73 The baby died ten minutes after
he was born.'4 If the defendant in Spencer could be convicted for harming a
fetus, a mother who behaves in a manner that also causes a baby to die shortly
after its birth should face similar consequences.
While state legislatures are making a good faith effort to grant increased
protection to fetuses, they do not go far enough toward protecting all possible
harm that may befall an unborn child. Minnesota aside, state penal codes do not
punish those who harm the fetus but do not kill it.7' Ironically, in order to
receive any protection from state penal codes, a fetus must often be aborted. It

69. See, for example, Minn Stat Ann 5 626.5561 (West 1994). Since abuse and neglect

proceedings are generally civil penalties, mothers do not face incarceration or heavy fines.
The state may choose to prosecute under these statutes, instead of criminal statutes, for
two reasons. First, abuse and neglect proceedings are commonly used to punish parents
who cannot, or do not, adequately care for their children. Their frequent use means that
established precedent exists for handling these cases, so creative statutory interpretation is
less often necessary for the state to successfully prosecute. Second, many people are
opposed to criminal sanctions for drug abuse during pregnancy. See notes 7, 128-39 and
accompanying text. To the extent that prosecutors agree, they may seek lesser penalties
under civil abuse and neglect statutes.
70. See, for example, Cal Health and Safety Code S 11757.59 (West 1991).
71. See Comment, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Next Step in the Protection of Fetal
Rights?, 92 Dickinson L Rev 691, 703-04 (1988).
72. 839 F2d 1341, 1342-43 (9th Cir 1988).
73. Id at 1342-43.

74. Id at 1342.
75. Comment, 92 Dickinson L Rev at 703 (cited in note 71).
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does an unborn child little good to punish the person who kills it, but not the
person who causes it permanent, irreparable damage.
II. Case Law
So far, courts have been the most active supporters and granters of fetal
protection. 6 Courts in several circuits have responded to fetal injury with a
variety of punishments, many of which are severe and apply to both third parties
and mothers. Additionally, many courts have dealt directly with cases in which
pregnant women ingest hazardous substances during pregnancy.
In Grodin v Grodin," a child sued his mother for damages to his teeth
which resulted from her use of tetracycline during pregnancy. In the civil negligence suit, the trial court granted summary judgment for the mother." The
appellate court remanded for a decision whether or not the mother's conduct
(tetracycline use during pregnancy) was reasonable.79 In making its decision, the
trial court was to examine whether the mother exercised reasonable judgment by
continuing to take tetracycline during pregnancy-despite her physician's instructions to the contrary.0 What makes the decision most unique is its holding that
a mother could be prosecuted for minor damages resulting from casual use of a
prescription drug. If the Michigan court prosecuted this minor injury to a fetus,
it might also convict women for using more dangerous substances."1 In fact,
under the Grodin court's reasonableness test, a pregnant drug user would likely
never escape liability. The court measures the risk of harm in the context of the
defendant's conduct. If there is a great risk of severe harm, the jury may decide
the mother's conduct is unreasonable and hold her liable for damages."2 In a
case where the pregnant mother uses controlled substances, this risk analysis
would surely be decided in the fetus's favor more often than in the mother's.
In In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 3 a New York court held that mothers who
bear children with positive toxicology readings may have their newborns removed from their custody because of neglect.8 4 The court asserted that "an
isolated detrimental act during pregnancy" may constitute neglect if the statutory
standard has been met. s Furthermore, the court held that the use of cocaine

76. This is not to say, however, that all courts support fetal protection. When such
protection is in direct conflict with a mother's rights, courts are especially tentative. I
merely note that courts appear to be more willing than legislatures to protect the fetus or
punish the mother.
77. 102 Mich App 396, 301 NW2d 869 (1981).
78. 301 NW2d at 870.
79. Id at 870-71.
80. Id at 871.
81. A Westlaw search reveals that the Michigan Appellate Court has not heard any
more cases of this type, so my assumption has not yet been tested.
82. Grodin, 301 NW2d at 871.
83. 157 AD2d 322, 556 NYS2d 280 (1990).
84. 556 NYS2d at 283.
85. Id. The statute at issue in this case defines a "neglected child" as one "whose
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two days before the birth of a baby constituted neglect within the meaning of the
statute. Hearings to determine whether the mother should retain custody of her
child were to begin immediately. This type of prosecution under child abuse and
neglect statutes is common, 6 as courts seek to punish women for their actions
without resorting to the more serious penalties that usually accompany criminal
statutes.
Other courts consider a drug addict's pregnancy to be a factor in sentencing
for other crimes. In the District of Columbia, for example, a superior court
sentenced one pregnant cocaine addict to 180 days in prison for second-degree
theft.

7

This sentence was appropriate because it prevented the mother from

continuing her drug habit during her pregnancy. The defendant in that case had
admitted that she was an addict and that she had smoked marijuana on the day
of her first sentencing. 8 In ordering the maximum sentence, the court considered the mother's addictive behavior as a factor relevant to the felony she had
committed. 9 The sentencing judge further commented, "I'm going to keep her
locked up until the baby is born because she's [sic] tested positive for cocaine
when she came before me ....

She's apparently an addictive personality and I'll

be darned if I'm going to have a baby born that way."9"
More recently, a court interpreted a statute to require criminal sanctions for
ingesting controlled substances during pregnancy. In Johnson v Florida,"'a state
appellate court creatively interpreted a drug trafficking statute to prosecute a
pregnant woman for transmitting drugs to her fetus. Since there was no Florida
statute under which a woman could be punished directly for taking drugs while
pregnant, the prosecutor relied on an alternative statute which allowed prosecution for "delivering" drugs to a minor.9 2 The statute had never been held applicable to fetuses; however, the prosecutor claimed that the mother delivered drugs
to a minor, arguing that delivery occurred after birth but before the umbilical
cord was cut."' The court agreed, noting that it was unimpressed with the

physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of a failure of his parent . . . to exercise a minimum degree
of care
or by misusing a drug or drugs." New York Judiciary-Court Acts, Family Court
Law, S 1012(f)(i) (McKinney 1983).

86. See, for example, In re Troy D., 215 Cal App 3d 889, 263 Cal Rep 869, 872-74
(1989); In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc 2d 31, 500 NE2d 935, 938-39 (1986); In re Baby X,
97 Mich App 111, 293 NW2d 736, 738-39 (1980).
87. United States v Brenda A. Vaughn, No F2172-88 ([DC] Sup Ct, June 24, 1988).

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 578 So2d 419 (Fla App 1991), rev'd, 602 So2d 1288 (Fla 1992).
92. Johnson, 578 So2d at 419, citing Fla Stat Ann S 893.13(4) (West 1994) ("

.

it is unlawful for any person 18 years of age or older to deliver any controlled substance
to a person under the age of 18 years.
93. Id at 419.
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mother's arguments concerning her right to privacy."4 Johnson, however, was
overturned on appeal."
In neither the District of Columbia case nor in Johnson v Floridawas there
a statute on point pertaining to the ingestion of drugs by pregnant women. At
first blush, the punishments these women received may appear harsh. However,
without laws that mandate a specific sentence (or no sentence at all), courts are
left with a great deal of discretion. This predicament will likely produce ad hoc
judgments and ineffective sentencing. The ultimate result is underdeterrence.
The District of Columbia Superior Court, which ordered the maximum
sentence for a pregnant drug addict convicted of theft, attempted to remedy the
problem by taking a strict stand. The court's decision is noteworthy for two reasons. First, while other courts decide in favor of mothers unless there is demonstrated harm to a newborn, the District of Columbia Superior Court acted in
response to possible harm to a fetus. Here, the court noted that criminal penalties should help the fetus recover from prenatal harm." This approach is
notably different from that of other courts, which act only after the newborn
shows signs of addiction or-deformities. Second, the court's decision is significant
because it imposed a sentence of incarceration, albeit ostensibly for the commission of a felony. Perhaps the court realized that rehabilitation and treatment
programs are ineffective. Alternatively, the court may have understood that
women who are merely fined could still return home to their drug supply.
Whatever its rationale, the court sought to free the fetus from the drugs that
endangered its life.
Inconsistency is the most troubling aspect of the courts' approaches to these
cases. While defendants are to some extent always subject to the whims of
judges, consistent precedent nevertheless encourages pregnant mothers to act legally-if a woman knows that there is a good chance that she will be jailed for
ingesting drugs during pregnancy, she may positively alter her behavior. On the
other hand, if a woman knows that the chance of being severely sanctioned for
her behavior is roughly equal to the chance that a judge will ignore her actions,
then she has no incentive to change her behavior. A consistent set of precedents,
crafted with a clear legislative mandate, would guide judges in their decisions and
more effectively alter pregnant drug users' behavior, since these women would
act with better knowledge of the consequences of their behavior.
III. Alternative Legislative Strategies
Prosecutors lack the statutory tools necessary to argue these cases in a
manner that protects fetuses. Similarly, courts are ill-equipped to decide these
cases so that fetuses consistently benefit. Congress must enact a law that elimi-

94. Id at 419-20.
95. Johnson v Florida, 602 S2d 1288, 1290 (Fla 1992) (holding that when legislative
intent behind a criminal statute is unclear, it should be construed most favorably to the
accused).
96. Vaughn, No F2172-88 ([DCI Sup Ct, June 24, 1988).
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nates this ad hoc prosecution and inconsistent precedent.
Neither the executive nor the judiciary can effect the changes necessary to
solve the problem. The president is unlikely to make punishing pregnant women
a priority. Moreover, it takes time for executive branch agencies to study the
problem, propose solutions, and implement change. The judiciary also lacks the
tools necessary to solve the problem. Absent clear statutes protecting fetuses,
courts have broad discretion in deciding cases involving drug use by pregnant
women. Thus, courts have often read state statutes creatively to punish pregnant
drug users. 7 Since most pregnant, addicted defendants do not appeal their
cases,9" trial courts decide these cases according to their fancy, and that decision
becomes law.
On the other hand, representative groups around the country could lobby
Congress and state legislatures, seeking fetal protection. Although this proposal
would take a long time to implement, it may nevertheless be the best means for
changing the status quo. As Judge Harding of the Florida Supreme Court
asserted "[n]either judges nor prosecutors can make criminal laws. This is the
purview of the Legislature. If the Legislature wanted to punish the uterine transfer of cocaine from a mother to her fetus, it would be up to the Legislature to
consider the attending public policy and constitutional arguments and then pass
its legislation." 99
In an environment where courts promulgate inconsistent legislation, and
where attorneys prosecute similar cases differently, a precisely crafted statute
could offer valuable guidance. Furthermore, statutes would provide effective
notice to potential defendants that their behavior will be monitored. With
effective notice, more mothers will change their behavior to comport with the
clear statute. Thus, there would be fewer cases and therefore fewer inconsistent
precedents. In fact, several authors note that the worst characteristic of the
current state of affairs is that courts may interfere in cases where the situation
could be better resolved by the actors involved.' 0
At the very least, a statute that addresses drug abuse by pregnant mothers in
a specific and tough manner would send an unequivocal message to all persons:
drug use by pregnant women will not be tolerated. In order to achieve this goal,
however, more than precision and fair notice are required. The statute must be
accompanied by a clear legislative history, which would justify the new approach. That approach should also embrace punishment that will fit all possible
circumstances.

97. See, for example, Johnson, 578 S2d at 419-20.

98. Many of these defendants are simply too poor to afford the legal resources necessary for a proper defense and are even less likely to be able to afford an appeal.
Interview with Mary Becker, Professor, University of Chicago Law School, in Chicago, IL
(Jan 12, 1994).

99. Johnson, 602 S2d at 1294, quoting People v Bremer, No 90-32227-FH ([Mich] Cir
Ct, Jan 31, 1991).
100. See, for example, Cole, 264 JAMA at 2665 (cited in note 10); Goldberg, 41
Rutgers L Rev at 622 (cited in note 3).
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Several statutory schemes satisfy these requirements. First, a statute could
impose civil sanctions on women who engage in negligent behavior that is likely
to harm their fetuses. This approach would simply be a variation of existing
child abuse and neglect statutes. In order to be most effective, this proposed law
would have to specifically punish harm to the fetus that is causally related to a
mother's drug use. At least two states have already passed similar laws. In
Minnesota, "[child] neglect includes prenatal exposure to a controlled substance... used by the mother for a non-medical purpose...." 0 Likewise, in
Florida, harm to a child's welfare includes "[p]hysical dependency of a newborn
infant upon any [controlled substance].""0 '
There are two benefits to civil sanctions. First, civil penalties for fetal neglect
are consistent with child neglect statutes. If the mother is only required to pay a
civil penalty, (e.g., a fine or submission to a child abuse and neglect investigation103), she can thereafter remain with her child. It is arguably better to raise
a child in a home where drugs are commonly used than in an environment where
there is no mother at all. Second, statutes that give custody to the state let the
mother have access to the neglected child while the state properly cares for the
child. Assuming that a mother's maternal instincts may encourage her to recover
so she may care for the infant by herself, frequent visits may be beneficial to the
mother, and the infant may also benefit from proper care that is not interrupted
by problems associated with drug abuse.
There are, however, three significant problems with a statute that relies on
civil sanctions. First, the money a mother uses to pay fines is money that could
be better used to buy clothes and food for her newborn. Moreover, if an addicted mother is required to pay a fine, one should worry about the measures she
will take to obtain the "drug money" that she no longer has. Second, civil
statutes do not protect a fetus during pregnancy. Fines imposed after a child is
born cannot ensure that the child will be born without abnormalities. Third,
punishment under civil statutes may prove to be too lenient. In Johnson, for
example, the defendant continued to use drugs during her pregnancy, despite the
existence of the Florida fetal neglect statute.1 If a legislature decides to combat drug use during pregnancy, it must enact a statute with a more powerful
deterrent effect.
A second legislative option would be a statute requiring mothers to engage
in helpful behavior during pregnancy, while at the same time restricting behavior

101. Minn Stat Ann S 626.556(2)(c) (West 1994).
102. Fla Stat Ann S 415.503(9)(a)(2) (West 1993).
103. For example, fines are a possible punishment for violation of Minn Stat Ann SS
609.267, 609.2671 (West 1994) (providing for ten thousand dollar fine or five-year
imprisonment for second-degree assault on an unborn child). Fines may also be assessed
under Minn Stat Ann S 609.268 (West 1987) (providing for thirty-thousand dollar fine or
fifteen-year imprisonment for death of an unborn child during commission of a crime).
104. Johnson, 578 S2d at 420. The prosecutor for this case probably agreed that the
punishment imposed by Florida's civil code was not severe enough, since Ms. Johnson was
charged with violation of a criminal statute.
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that could harm the fetus. For example, pregnant women could be required to
drink orange juice and refrain from sexual intercourse.' 5 This alternative approach was tested in a California case in which a drug-abusing pregnant woman
was charged with neglect for failure to go to a hospital after experiencing vaginal
bleeding and for failure to follow her physician's order to refrain from sexual
intercourse.0 6 The court dismissed the charges, stating that it would not restrict a pregnant woman's behavior absent a clear causal connection between
07
action and harm.1
The Stewart case was decided correctly for two reasons. First, illegal behavior does more damage to fetuses than behavior that is currently legal.' Stewart therefore properly emphasizes the need for a clear causal connection between
a mother's action and serious fetal harm before her actions may be punished.
Instead of forcing women to engage in positive behavior that may help the fetus,
a statute should work to eliminate harmful behavior that definitely does damage
the fetus. Legislators should focus on eliminating the clear problem, instead of
tinkering with a lesser one. Second, Stewart correctly implies that banning legal
behavior does nothing to eliminate the harmful effects resulting from illegal
behavior.
A third type of statute would criminalize behavior that has a clear causal
link to fetal injury but which is otherwise legal. The best example of a law
falling into this category would be a statute that punishes women who drink
alcohol during pregnancy. As noted above, studies demonstrate that alcohol
significantly affects fetal development,0 9 so there is clearer justification for
punishing this behavior than for punishing a woman who engages in sexual intercourse, which risks injuring the fetus only in the last four weeks of pregnan-

105. Obstetricians sometimes advise pregnant women to follow both of these instructions. Interview with Kenneth L. Noller, M.D., Professor and Chair, Department of
Obstetrics and Gynecology, University of Massachusetts Medical School, Uan 14, 1994).
See also the physician's instructions given to Pamela Rae Stewart in People v Pamela Rae
Stewart, No M508197 ([Cal] Mun Ct, 1987), cited in Mary Becker, Cynthia Grant Bowman, and Morrison Torrey, eds, Cases and Materials on Feminist Jurisprudence: Taking
Women Seriously 426-27 (West, 1994).
106. Stewart, No M508197 (Cal Mun Ct 1987), cited in Becker, Bowman, and Torrey,
eds, Feminist Jurisprudence at 426-27 (cited in note 105).
107. Id. The court also dismissed the charges against Stewart on equal protection
grounds, noting that the legislature cannot make illegal a woman's otherwise legal behavior
(e.g., sexual intercourse) merely because she is pregnant. Compare Geduldig v Aiello, 417
US 484 (1974) (holding that state statute which withholds certain benefits from pregnant
women does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
108. See notes 10-28 and accompanying text.
109. See, for example, Ouellette, et al, 297 N Eng J Med at 528 (cited in note 19)
(finding that thirty-two percent of infants born to heavy drinkers suffered congenital
abnormalities, as compared to nine percent among women who abstained from alcohol
during pregnancy). See also Sterling K. Clarren and David W. Smith, The Fetal Alcohol
Syndrome, 298 N Eng J Med 1063 (1978) (describing the physical and mental deformities
that result from prenatal exposure to alcohol).
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cy." ° Furthermore, the state regulates drinking in other contexts, such as driving a car and drinking by minors.
Nevertheless, a statute that punishes otherwise legal behavior that is causally
linked to fetal injury also has significant drawbacks. First, as with the statute
restricting sexual intercourse, the harm is less severe than the harm which results
when a pregnant woman ingests illegal substances-the conduct that Congress
should really target. Second, the statute would have to distinguish between heavy
drinkers and casual drinkers, because a statute that criminalizes all drinking
would have to pass strict constitutional scrutiny, since it punishes a class of
persons based on a physical characteristic."' It would be ridiculous to incarcerate a pregnant woman who has a sip of champagne on New Year's Eve. Instead,
the legislature will have to draw a line at the point where alcohol use approaches
abuse and therefore endangers the fetus. It would be necessary, but impossible,
for the legislature to draw this line. Third, line-drawing would be difficult
because women with different physical characteristics are affected differently by
2
the amount of alcohol they drink."
IV. A Proposal
To remedy the concerns addressed in this Comment, I propose a statute
calling for strict criminal penalties for women who ingest controlled substances
during pregnancy. To improve the current law, such a statute would prescribe a
simple approach to punishment by legislating incarceration for a period of time
comparable to what is prescribed by drug possession and distribution statutes.
Such a statute would also survive an equal protection challenge, since it merely
clarifies the application of a statute that already applies to everyone: under
current laws, no one may legally manufacture, dispense, or possess controlled
substances."' Furthermore, it would be consistent with public policy goals
already articulated by the federal and state legislatures.
The existing drug criminalization statute should be supplemented with

110. Cunningham, et al, eds, Williams Obstetrics at 263 (cited in note 9).
111. United Automobile Workers v Johnson Controls, Inc, 499 US 187 (1991) (subjecting discrimination based on a physical characteristic to a strict scrutiny test).
112. Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalizationof
"Fetal Abuse," 101 Harv L Rev 994, 1008 (1988).
113. 21 USC 5 841 (West 1994). For a clear statement that a statute which treats
pregnant women differently from other persons does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Geduldig, which states the following:
While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that
every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is [an unconstitutional] sex-based
classification .... Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition
with unique characteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy
are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members
of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude
pregnancy from the coverage of legislation ... on any reasonable basis, just as
with respect to any other physical condition.
417 US at 496-97 n 20 (emphasis added).
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provisions for a rehabilitation program to enable women to care for their
children after their behavior improves and funding for medical treatment to
ensure that women receive adequate prenatal care from a physician. Penalties are
based on Title 21 of the United States Code and build from its provisions.
A. PENALTIES
Current drug laws do not deter women from taking drugs while pregnant.
This is partly due to the fact that addiction is a disease that is difficult to cure.
Further, current laws do not deter because the penalties are not strong enough
to alter behavior. A woman who knows that discovery of her drug use will only
result in a penalty such as mandatory enrollment in drug treatment, education,
and counseling programs is not likely to change her behavior in order to avoid
her "sentence." For example, in Massachusetts, a state with no specific civil or
criminal penalties for ingesting a controlled substance during pregnancy, twentyseven percent of women studied used marijuana during pregnancy, and eighteen
percent used cocaine." 4 These numbers are not decreasing."us
In response to the reality that pregnant women are not now deterred from
drug use, Congress should enact tough penalties which address this issue, using
the "Offenses and Penalties" section of Title 21 of the United States Code as a
starting point. As a punitive measure, 21 USC § 844 punishes simple possession
of a controlled substance with a one-year prison term or a fine of up to one
thousand dollars." 6 Repeat offenders are subject to increased jail sentences or
fines." 7 Under 21 USC S 849, distribution of a controlled substance to a minor
merits a doubled sentence."' In the case of pregnant women, this double sentence and a two- to ten-thousand dollar fine should also apply to in utero "distribution" of a controlled substance to a fetus. Prosecutors have never successfully argued that ingesting drugs during pregnancy is analogous to "distributing"
controlled substances to a minor." 9 To correct this inadequacy, 21 USC 5 844
should specifically note that pregnant drug users "distribute" drugs to their fetuses and thus are subject to the statute's penalties. The only difference between
the punishments in this proposal and those set out in S 849 is that pregnant drug
users would be sent to rehabilitative institutes rather than penitentiaries.
It is likely that Congress intended 21 USC S 849 to deter young persons
from becoming addicted to drugs. Thus, the same logic that compelled Congress
to enact this statute should apply to fetuses, which if carried to term will
someday become addicted children. At the very least, the United States criminal
justice system seeks to deter drug use. Current laws reflect the belief that prison
is an effective deterrent. Assuming that pregnant and non-pregnant people are

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Zuckerman, et al, 320 N Eng J Med at 762 (cited in note 22).
Id.
21 USC S 844(a) (1994).
Id.
21 USC S 849 (West 1994).
See, for example, Johnson, 578 S2d at 419.
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similarly deterred by the threat of a prison sentence, consistency demands that
both be subject to the same punishment. Thus, by imposing a jail sentence and
a large fine commensurate with that mandated by 21 USC § 849, Congress could
more effectively deter drug use by women during pregnancy. 2 '
The doubled sentence applying to distribution to minors can also be justified
through retributive theories of criminal punishment.' When a woman decides
not to abort her pregnancy, she assumes a duty not to harm her fetus." Those
who believe in retributive punishment will likely want to see the mother who
does harm her fetus pay a similar price by punishing her for the use of drugs.
This category doubtless includes some Congressmen who vote for the drug laws.
B. REHABILITATION AND PRENATAL CARE

To be most effective, punishment for ingestion of a controlled substance
during pregnancy should include a rehabilitative element that will better enable
mothers to care for their children. If legislatures do not require treatment for
pregnant drug users, women will be severely punished over and over again for
the same behavior. The babies born to these women will continue to suffer the
effects of their mothers' drug use. Further, a rehabilitative element will also work
toward pleasing those who argue for education and counseling programs and
who object to a criminal statute.
Additionally, rehabilitation does more than please scholars. A 1991 study
conducted by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists shows
that intensive prenatal care can help a woman become drug free while she is
pregnant." The study showed that constant obstetric care and nutrition counseling resulted in an increased number of healthy births and drug-free deliver-

120. Empirical evidence about whether imprisonment actually deters criminals is inconclusive. See Johannes Andenaes, Punishment and Deterrence 9 (Michigan, 1974); Franklin
Zimring, Perspectives on Deterrence (Public Health Service, 1971); Alfred Blumstein, et al,
eds, Deterrence and Incapacitation:Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime
Rates 6-7 (Natl Acad Sci, 1978). However, authors have argued that if the threat of
punishment is severe and credible, the criminal being punished is more likely to be deterred from engaging in delinquent behavior in the future. See Johannes Andenaes, General
Prevention: A Broader View of Deterrence, in Rudolph J. Gerber and Patrick D.
McAnany, eds, Contemporary Punishment: Views, Explanations and Justifications 108-19
(Notre Dame, 1972).
121. Some commentators argue that subjecting criminals to certain deprivations because
they deserve it is the soundest way to restore peace of mind to noncriminals and to
command respect for the law from criminals. See Jack P. Gibbs, Crime, Punishment and
Deterrence 82-83 (Elsevier, 1975); Andrew Von Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments 51-55 (Hill and Wang, 1976). Since a fetus is defenseless and should not be
subjected to deformities arising from its mother's drug use, retributive punishment against
the mother may be the only way to restore the balance between the two beings.
122. For a fuller explanation of this idea, see John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty
and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 Va L Rev 405, 438 (1983).
123. Teri Randall, "Intensive" Prenatal Care May Deliver Healthy Babies to Pregnant
Drug Abusers, 265 JAMA 2773, 2773 (1991).
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ies." 4 This intensive prenatal care is important because while most existing
statutes focus on punishing the mother, this one would focus on improving the
life of the fetus. A statute that addresses this issue would sentence the women it
punishes to a rehabilitation center, not jail.12 The center would be similar to
a prison in that time spent there is mandatory.' However, unlike a prison, it
would be partially staffed by physicians who would administer intensive prenatal
care. This program would be expensive.2 7 However, if Congress is serious
about curbing drug use by pregnant women, it should support this proposal. It
would not only decrease existing drug use, but it would also help prevent the
birth of addicted babies.
V. Objections and Responses
There are two possible objections to a statute that criminalizes a mother's
ingestion of drugs during pregnancy: such a statute interferes with a mother's
right to reproductive freedom, and it may deter her from seeking adequate
medical treatment.

A. A MOTHER'S

AUTONOMY RIGHT

Women have long argued that the Constitution grants a right to privacy. As
the Supreme Court explained in Roe v Wade,'28 the right to privacy includes a
mother's qualified decision to terminate her pregnancy. By extension, women
argue that their actions during pregnancy (at least during the first trimester,
when the decision whether to abort is left to the woman and her attending
physician) should also be under their discretion. This privacy argument is wellgrounded in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. It is the mother, not
the fetus, who is protected by the right to privacy. Thus, the mother has a right
to procreative decisionmaking that the fetus does not enjoy. 9 Supporters of
this argument also note that individual states have a greater interest in ensuring
that fetuses are born than in ensuring that they have the highest quality of life

124. Id at 2773-74.
125. Currently, many drug rehabilitation programs are unavailable to pregnant women.
See Allen study, cited in id. See also notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
126. This may help address problems inherent in programs like Illinois's Parents Too
Soon, discussed in note 1.
127. However, treatment of alcohol- or drug-affected infants is also extremely expensive.
For example, the California State Department of Health Services estimates that the average
cost of each child entering a neonatal intensive care unit is nineteen thousand dollars.
California Health and Safety Code SS 1157.59(b)(5), 1157.59(b)(9) (West 1991). In fiscal
year 1986-87, the State of California spent $104,000,000 on neonatal care for alcoholand drug-affected infants, prompting passage of the Alcohol and Drug Affected Mothers
and Infants Act of 1990. California Health and Safety Code SS 1157.5 et seq (West
1991).
128. 410 US 113 (1973).
129. This aspect of Roe is explained in greater detail in Note, 101 Harv L Rev at 99698 (cited in note 112).
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possible. Therefore, the "compelling state interest" argument relied upon in Roe
is less applicable in this context."' 0
There are two notable objections to the privacy argument. First, Roe and
later Supreme Court decisions do not hold that the rights of the mother are
absolute. As presently interpreted, Roe permits several restrictions on a woman's
right to seek an abortion. In a recent decision on abortion rights, Webster v
Reproductive Health Services,"' the Supreme Court stated that it did "not see
why the State's interest in protecting potential human life should come into
existence only at the point of viability, and that there should therefore be a rigid
line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before viability."' Likewise, most judicial decisions concerning this issue speak of a "compelling state interest" in protecting the rights of the fetus, which can only be
outweighed in situations where the rights of the mother are clearly more compelling (e.g., to save her life). Here, where the presumption is in favor of the
fetus, a mother's "right" to ingest controlled substances is insufficient to outweigh the fetus' right to a healthy life.
A second objection to the privacy argument is that a woman's right to an
abortion does not include the right to mistreat her fetus. In fact, some scholars,
such as Professor John Robertson, argue that once a woman chooses not to have
an abortion, she has consented to give her fetus the best care possible.' Robertson asserts that "[t]he mother has, if she conceives and chooses not to abort,
a legal and moral duty to bring the child into the world as healthy as is reasonably possible. She has a duty to avoid actions or omissions that will damage the
fetus and child, just as she has a duty to protect the child's welfare once it is
born unless she transfers this duty to another." 3 ' Accordingly, if Congress ever
chooses to accept Robertson's argument, it could easily justify enacting a law
that punishes a woman for negligent behavior during pregnancy.
B. DETERRENCE FROM SEEKING MEDICAL TREATMENT
Other opponents to criminalizing the ingestion of controlled substances
during pregnancy argue that criminal penalties for drug use during pregnancy
will deter those who fear potential prosecution from seeking prenatal care. 3 '
This fear is not unreasonable, as hospitals are required to report abusive or neglectful behavior, which often includes drug abuse by pregnant women. 36
Furthermore, the reports that a physician provides to the state may be used

130. Id.
131. 492 US 490 (1989).
132. Id at 519.
133. Robertson, 69 Va L Rev at 437 (cited in note 122) ("Once [a woman] decides to
forgo abortion and the state chooses to protect the fetus, the woman loses the liberty to
act in ways that would adversely affect the fetus.").
134. Id at 438.
135. Cole, 264 JAMA at 2667-68 (cited in note 10).
136. Id.
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either to prosecute abusive women for crimes, such as possession of narcotics, or
to impose penalties for abuse and neglect.17 Moreover, both situations involve
an illegal act that results in statutorily prescribed penalties.
While this fear of imprisonment is not unfounded, reliance on that fear may
be exaggerated. A study conducted by the Community Service Society in New
York has found several other possible explanations for why women refuse to
seek prenatal care. One explanation is that "the use of such substances, especially addiction to alcohol and drugs, interferes with the women's ability to control
their lives and to seek care and adhere to routines. Still another explanation may
be that substance abuse is one of3 many poor health habits, which include not
seeking care when appropriate.'
Two more explanations should be noted. First, women who realize that they
have a moral duty to care for their fetuses may be ashamed by the fact that they
are not living up to their expected obligations. Rather than allow their physician
to see their neglect, they decline medical care or "treat" themselves throughout
their pregnancies. Second, women who use their income to buy drugs may not
have the money to seek medical care. Like all low-income persons who cannot
afford treatment, these women will most likely wait until the last minute to seek
prenatal care. 3 ' In short, women who cannot afford care or who neglect to
seek care will not be deterred from visiting their physicians simply because they
may be prosecuted for drug use. Thus, while the argument that women should
not be prosecuted for using drugs during pregnancy has some merit, it is nevertheless an insufficient reason for not implementing a new statute.
VI. Conclusion
Fetal abuse law is currently in a state of disarray. While pregnant women
negligently ingest controlled substances, legislators tinker with child neglect and
abuse statutes. The result is a set of laws that rarely protects fetuses (as opposed
to children) and almost never specifically penalizes drug use by pregnant women.
Left to creative interpretation, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges have
created inconsistent judicial precedent that, for the most part, fails as well.
A statute that criminalizes all controlled substance use during pregnancy
would provide a consistent approach to the problem of fetal abuse. This statute
should include strict penalties to deter drug use, a rehabilitation program to
teach women how to care more effectively for their children, and funding for

137. See, for example, ACLU, 3 Reproductive Rights Update 7 (Sept 13, 1991) (describing a case in which a pregnant woman reported her drug use to her obstetrician, who in
turn told the state of Virginia, which prosecuted the woman for criminal child abuse).
138. Francis G. Caro, et al, Barriers to Prenatal Care: An Examination of Use of
Prenatal Care among Low-Income Women in New York City 24 (Community Service Society of NY, 1988).
139. See Donald B. Binsacca, et al, Factors Associated with Low Birthweigbt in an Inner-City Population: The Role of Financial Problems, 77 Am J Pub Health 505 (1987).
Drug use aside, women with "financial problems," including a lack of money for bus fare
to the hospital, are at the highest risk of bearing a low birthweight baby. Id.
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intensive prenatal care that provides newborns the chance to recover from their
mothers' harmful behavior.
It is not too late to prevent thousands of babies from being born with
physical and mental defects. Enacting this new statute would send a strong
message to pregnant women: use of controlled substances during pregnancy will
not be tolerated.

